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Abstract
Given that brands (products) are location speciﬁci nt e r m so fc o v e r -
age of retail stores, we allow consumers to have preferences over location
and products to carry distribution costs, alongside preferences and costs
over other observable and unobservable product characteristics. We em-
bed these considerations into Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) to jointly
estimate demand and cost parameters for brands (products) in Retail Car-
bonated Soft Drinks. Allowing for location has a very signiﬁcant impact
on estimated primitives and the predictive power of the structural model.
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11 Introduction
Embedding heterogenous transportation costs into the utility of consumers has
a long theoretical history. Familiar theoretical settings include the linear city
of Hotelling (1929) and D’Aspremont et al (1979) and circular city of Salop
(1979)1. A core innovation of this paper is to embed consumer preferences
for location, drawn from product speciﬁc retail locations, into demand and,
via a structural model of equilibrium, we model products to carry distribution
costs. We embed these considerations, together with preferences and costs
associated with other observable and unobservable product characteristics, into
the estimation routine of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, BLP, (1995) to jointly
estimate the primitives of demand and cost for 178 brands (products) in Retail
Carbonated Soft Drinks over 28 bi-monthly periods. Allowing for product retail
locations greatly enriches the demand and cost primitives that can be used in
structural models of retail industries2.
We simulate the distribution of consumer tastes for product location using
AC Nielsen data on store coverage of brands (products) in retail Carbonated
Soft Drinks (CSD). The nature of aggregation over stores is measured as a
weighted (eﬀective) coverage of stores, where the weight given to each store is
its size (market share) in terms of the overall market level CSD turnover. Brands
belonging to the same company, or segments of deﬁned product characteristics,
have very heterogenous eﬀective coverage of the 12,000 outlets. We exploit this
product (j) heterogeneity by randomizing over eﬀective store coverage to create
a distribution of consumers with and without disutility resulting from each
brand’s location. Since stores, weighted by size, locate in a catchment area,
not covering a store clearly creates distance to a brand for consumers in this
catchment area. We simulate a probability distribution of consumers likely to
ﬁnd the brand in their nearest shop and others that will not and incur disutility
3.
1The characterization of an equilibrium in oligopoly in the presence of heterogenous con-
sumer transportation costs still generates theoretical interest [see Irmen and Thisse (1998)].
2In this paper we use the estimated primitives to undertake a static analysis of the retail
Carbonated Soft Drinks (CSD) market. See Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2004) for their use
in dynamic models of industries.
3Clearly an individual chooses the product that gives the highest utility. For an individual
some products may have a disutility associated with not being in the nearest shop, others do
not. One could try to back out the nature of transportation costs for individuals, based on
simulations of the number of stores to be searched before ﬁnding the product. We experimeted
with this idea. The additionally draws would be undertaken using more structure (deﬁning
2A major innovation of the BLP framework is that it allows one to estimate a
random utility model at the product level interacting exogeneous distributions
in consumer characteristics (income level s )w i t hp r o d u c tl e v e lc h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
(particularly price) to impose a more general functional form for utility and allow
for substitution patterns that are more plausible4. This requires an estimation
strategy that involves simulation and numerical methods in moving from the
individual to aggregate demands (see Mc Fadden (1989), Pakes and Pollard
(1989) for further details). Unfortunately, a reliance on the market-level (t)
distributions of consumer characteristics, do not give the degrees of freedom
one might like5. In this paper we improve our estimates of demand primitives
allowing for a distribution of consumer taste for product speciﬁc location and it’s
interaction with price. Allowing for product (j) speciﬁc consumer heterogeneity
has a signiﬁcant impact on estimated primitives and on the predictive power of
the structural model. Marketing data from retail stores is an obvious source of
information on product characteristics suitable for the BLP estimation routine.
In this paper we highlight important eﬃciency gains from using information on
distribution structures, also available from marketing companies, in the BLP
estimation routine.
The BLP estimation routine, based on Berry (1994), also allows for correla-
tions between product prices and unobservable (to the econometrician) product
characteristics. We model consumer choice and pricing (short-run quantity and
price movements) taking the strategic placing of brands over stores as given,
among other longer term choices in product characteristics. Given that a brands’
eﬀective coverage of stores by companies varies greatly across products, we allow
the distribution of consumer taste for product speciﬁc location and its interac-
tion with price to be correlated with the unobservable in demand. In addition,
we allow distribution costs associated with product speciﬁc location to be cor-
the max number of stores searched) and did not lead to a signiﬁcant change in our results.
We prefer to work with the simple idea that individuals have some disutility or not. The level
of disutility is the same irrespective of whether an individual travels to the second or tenth
nearest store. This assumption works for Carbonated Soft Drinks, but may not be realistic
for expensive items such as automobiles.
4The theoretical considerations and the algorithm necessary to estimate the random coef-
ﬁcient model, not jointly estimated with the cost function, is nicely outlined in Nevo (2000)
and Nevo (2001).
5The distribution of consumer characteristics relevant to products inside the market may
well be diﬀerent to those purchasing the outside option (see Mariuzzo, 2004). Likewise the
distribution of relevant consumer characteristics may also vary dramatically across products
inside the market, see Berry Levinsohn and Pakes (2004) and Petrin (2002).
3related with the unobservable in the cost function. Finally, we motivate the use
of product level store coverage and inventory data to construct Hausman and
Taylor (1981) and BLP (1995) type instrumental variables.
In a counterfactual exercise, holding the parameters of the surface of the
utility and cost function constant, as well as the distribution of non-price prod-
uct characteristics constant, we examine the eﬀects on welfare in an equilibrium
that results from a change in the distribution of consumer taste for product
location. By holding marginal costs ﬁxed we change the simulated numbers of
consumers having no disutility due to having products in their nearest shop by
expanding eﬀective store coverage for each product by one per cent. Solving for
a new short-run equilibrium in prices and market shares at the product level,
resulting for an exogenous change in the distribution of consumer taste charac-
teristics, is a non-trivial exercise in thep r e s e n c eo fn o n - l i n e a rf u n c t i o n a lf o r m s .
We introduce a numerical method to solve for the new equilibrium as part of a
nonlinear programming problem. Clearly, reducing the numbers of consumers
with disutility for all products inside the market induces all own and cross-price
elasticities to become more elastic. This has the eﬀect of increasing price com-
petition inside the market but it also induces a market expansion eﬀect that
brings consumers in from consuming the outside good. Overall, consumer and
producer surplus increases as a result of a this change in the distribution of
consumer characteristics6.
The next section summarizes the Irish Retail Carbonated Soft Drink market
and our data. In Section 3 we outline the underlying theoretical model. Section
4 highlights our estimation methods and computational techniques. In Section 5
we discuss our estimation results and undertake some positive analysis of the in-
dustry. In section 6 we undertake a counterfactual by changing the distribution
of consumer taste for location. We outline our conclusion in section 7.
6Mariuzzo, Walsh and Whelan (2003), using the data in this paper, oﬀer anti-trust author-
ities a simple nested logit regression to get a rough picture of the market share and power
relationship in a diﬀerentiated product industry. If one wishes to go further and undertake
counterfactuals on equilibrium price and quantity outcomes, one is forced to jointly estimate
the parameters of the utility and cost function with as much ﬂexibility in functional forms as
possible. Flexibility implies one has to deal with nonlinearities using numerical methods in
the estimation procedure and in the counterfactual exercise. In this paper, we make advances
in the speciﬁcation of functional forms and in the procedure for undertaking counterfactuals.
42 Industry and Data
AC Nielsen collated a panel database of all brands in Carbonated Soft Drinks
distributed throughout 12,000 Irish retail stores for use in our empirical anal-
ysis7. The database provides 28 bi-monthly periods spanning October 1992 to
March 1997 for 178 brands, identiﬁed for 13 ﬁrms and 40 product characteris-
tics within the particular business of Retail Carbonated Soft Drinks. The data
record the retail activities of both Irish and Foreign owned brands/ﬁrms selling
throughout the stores of the Irish retail sector. Large stores are supermarket
chains that cater for one-stop shopping. Small outlets are convenience stores
that cater for impulse shopping. The structure of retail outlets that brands sold
across was stable throughout the period we study.
The retail market for Carbonated Soft Drinks in Ireland is broadly similar
in structure to the U.S. In 1997, the top two ﬁrms collectively account for 73
per cent of the Irish market and 75 per cent of the US retail market. Inequality
in retail sales as measured by the Gini co-eﬃcient is 0.72 in Ireland and 0.68
i nt h eU S .T h e r ea r ed i ﬀerences between Ireland and the US that are typical of
European Carbonated Soft Drinks markets. These diﬀerences are highlighted
in case studies of several countries in Sutton (1991). The Cola segment of the
market is 35 to 40 per cent in Europe, compared to 63 per cent in the US. Flavor
segments are similar to the US in Ireland. Chain store own-labels are a small
feature of the Irish Market. Like the US the Irish market is heavily branded
market.
W eh a v eb r a n dl e v e li n f o r m a t i o no nt h ep e rl i t r eb r a n dp r i c e( w e i g h t e da v e r -
age of individual brand unit prices across all stores selling the brand, weighted
by brand sales share within the store), quantity (thousand liters), sales value
(thousand Irish pounds), store coverage (based on counts of stores size weighted
by store size in terms of overall Carbonated Soft Drink turnover), inventories
(number of days to stock out on day of audit given the current rate of brand
sales during the bi-monthly period), ﬁrm attachment and product (ﬂavor, pack-
aging, and diet) characteristics. An interesting feature of the AC Nielsen data
is their identiﬁcation of various product segments within the market for Car-
bonated Soft Drinks, which group clusters of brands by 40 characteristics: 4
ﬂavors (Cola, Orange, Lemonade and Mixed Fruit), 5 diﬀerent packaging types
7We are bound by a contract of conﬁdentiality with AC Nielsen not to reveal information,
not otherwise available on the market.
5(Cans, Standard Bottle, 1.5 Litre, 2 Litre and Multi-Pack of Cans) and 2 dif-
ferent sweeteners, diet and regular. The number of the product characteristics
was very stable throughout the period of this study8. To allow for ﬂavor seg-
ments (Cola, Orange, Lemonade and Mixed Fruit) is standard in the analysis
of Carbonated Soft Drinks [see Sutton (1991)].
To see why packaging format is recognized as a crucial feature of this market,
in Figure I we graph the seasonal cycles of carbonated drink sales by packaging
type. One must realize that 90 per cent of cans and standard bottles are impulse
buys distributed through small stores. In contrast, the majority of 2 litre and
multi-pack cans are distributed through one-stop supermarket shopping. The
1.5 litre is somewhere between these extremes. The industry has introduced
diﬀerent packaging to satisfy diﬀerent consumer needs within both the impulse
and one-stop shopping segments (Walsh and Whelan, 1999). For example, cans
peak in the summer months of June and July, when people lunch outside in
parks. In contrast, 2 Litre bottles sales peak over the winter months of De-
cember and January, the festive season. Packaging clearly represents diﬀerent
segments of the market. Thus, we have forty combinations of product charac-
teristics delineated in our data. Packaging by time dummies turn out to be very
important control variables in demand and cost. Not only do they control for
diﬀerent seasonal cycles in demand, but also for the nature of the buy (store) in
terms of impulse (small store) or one-stop shopping (supermarket). In the cost
function, packaging by time dummies control for plastic, glass and aluminium
input costs that can change over-time. Packaging as a product characteristic
tends to be omitted in studies of retail industries, such as Nevo (2000). Even
though the focal point in this paper is to highlight the importance of product
locations across stores, the importance of packaging in our functional forms and
r e s u l t si sa n o t h e rc o n t r i b u t i o n .
We deﬁne ﬁrm business as retail Carbonated Soft Drinks. Yet, ﬁrms may
or may not place brands across the various segments, combinations of product
characteristics, of the market. In Table 1 we document company coverage of
segments and the within segments weighted coverage of stores, weighted by a
stores share of the market level Carbonated Soft Drinks turnover. We undertake
8We take the emergence of such segments as an outcome of history. If in Carbonated
Soft Drinks consumers were fully mobile across segments and advertising was very eﬀective,
the market would evolve to be dominated by one segment. Taste structures and advertising
outlays, amongst other factors, have driven the current day segmentation of the market by
product attribute , see Sutton (1998).
6our analysis by comparing the top two companies, Coca-Cola Bottlers (Coca-
Cola Co. franchise) and C&C (Pepsico franchise), with the group of smaller
companies (mainly Irish/British owned). The top two companies have broad
coverage of the product segments. We see that within segment store coverage
is not company but brand speciﬁc. For example, Coca-Cola Bottlers has wide
distribution with Regular Cola, by most packaging types, but market coverage
is clearly less aggressive in regular Orange and Mixed Fruit characteristics. This
is where competition from the small companies is greatest.
Details of the product characteristics and associated number of ﬁrms and
brands they host are set out in Table 2. The structure of the market has large
companies competing across most characteristics and facing competition from
diﬀerent small independents within each segment. In each segment market size
to sunk cost and the nature of price and non-price competition seem to limit the
number of ﬁrms that can operate (see Walsh and Whelan (2002a)). The number
of ﬁrms that operate in each segment is quite small. Yet, due to certain local
taste characteristics, particularly in orange and mixed fruit, and specialization
into a subset of stores, small companies can ﬁll a quality window and survive
alongside the brands of large companies. Details of the product characteristics
in terms of price per litre and unit sales and revenue shares are also outlined in
Table 2.
In terms of market share and pricing, packaging matters. For example, 2
liters regular cola have lower prices and higher volume, while regular cola cans
sell at higher prices with a lower volume. Yet, the revenue shares are not so
diﬀerent. How can we tell which products (segments and companies) earn more
proﬁt? We use a structural model to back-out estimates of mark-ups (marginal
cost) for brands (segments and companies). Consumers are likely to have dif-
ferent tastes for packaging and brands incur diﬀerent packaging costs, among
other factors, which allow us to estimate primitives of demand and cost within
a structural model and ascertain the role of packaging in the determination of
mark-ups at the brand and segment level.
Another important aspect of the paper is to allow for brand speciﬁcl o c a t i o n s
to inﬂuence consumer taste and costs. We allow consumers to have preferences
over location and products to carry distribution costs alongside preferences and
costs associated with other product characteristics. In table 3 we detail eﬀective
store coverage and eﬀective inventories levels, within the stores covered, by
7segments. Packaging type does indicate the nature of stores covered. The
distribution structures in terms of unweighted store counts would reﬂect this.
Cans and standard packaging are generally in many more stores that 2 litres.
Yet, the trend in eﬀective (market) coverage of stores is less obvious as the 2 litres
will always cover the bigger stores. In addition, eﬀective coverage by brands of
the various segments does not change much overtime for regular brands. Diet
brands tend to be a bit more volatile. The weighted average of inventories
within the stores that a brand covers is measured as the number of days to
stock out on the day of audit given the current rate of brand sales during the
previous bi-monthly period. Net of the seasonal cycle how do brands, aggregated
to segments, manage delivery costs? We see clearly that segments depending
more on the impulse buys/small stores (indicated by the cans and standard
packaging format), use inventories more. Delivery costs are clearly higher and
can be reduced with the use of inventories. The use of inventories is pretty
stable over time. We control for distribution costs coming from the degree of
store coverage and, with inventories, the costs of distributing within the stores
that are covered. In the following section we outline the demand side, the supply
side and the market equilibrium.
3 The Model
We assume price taking individuals to be exogenously placed in diﬀerent loca-
tions. Stores place themselves in consumer catchment areas. Stores may carry
all products or only use a subset of the existing products. Our Carbonated Soft
Drinks market is oligopolistic and brands are diﬀerentiated by characteristics
and location. We model ﬁrms as price-setting multiproduct oligopolists and
assume the existence of Nash equilibrium in prices given the nature of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation on two dimensions. Theoretically we take both dimensions of
product diﬀerentiation as an outcome of long run decisions associated with large
sunk costs. Yet we do allow for movements in location to be endogenous in our
estimation routine. We wish to model short-run price and quantity movements
for each brand. We model demand by aggregating over consumer choice to the
product level. Consumers have heterogenous preferences over observables, such
as location and other product characteristics (price), and unobservable char-
acteristics. As an outcome of a multiproduct Nash pricing setting equilibrium
8we simultaneously model marginal costs as a result of observable distribution
costs and costs associated with other observable and unobservable product char-
acteristics. Having our demand and cost primitives consistent with a structural
model of equilibrium, we are able to construct a Lerner Index for each brand
and undertake a welfare analysis.
3.1 Demand
We analyze demand using a discrete choice approach and deﬁne a product to
be the average consumption of 220 ml of soft carbonates per day. A consumer
i decides whether to buy product j ∈ J in period t ∈ T (where j in our case
is a brand of carbonates) or the outside option. The consumer chooses in each
period t the product j that gives her the highest utility uijt (including the utility
for the outside option). On the other side of the market, ﬁrms decide on a set of
brand prices that maximize their proﬁts. Let F be the set of ﬁrms in our market
and J the set of all diﬀerent products produced. Each ﬁrm f ∈ F produces a
Jf ⊂ J subset of products. We write down an individual i0s indirect utility, a
random utility model, for product j in period t as,
uijt = −α1pjt + x1












where pjt is the price of product j in period t, x1 are product characteristics
that enter linearly in our estimates, whereas x2 are those that enter nonlinearly.
The subscripts A,C,N stand for Age, Closeness,a n dNormal distribution,r e -
spectively, which individuate our consumers (observed and unobserved) charac-
teristics. This upla deﬁnes each consumers’ taste for quality and sensitivity to
prices (product characteristics that enter x2). The sensitivity to prices reﬂects
individual reactions to a price change are diﬀerent when drawn from a certain
age group or have a diﬀerent taste for product j depending on whether it is in
the nearest store or not (Closeness). While consumer demographics and unob-
servable consumer heterogeneity is only market (t)s p e c i ﬁc, the interaction of
the closeness to stores distribution with price is product (j) speciﬁca n dc a nb e
estimated with far greater degrees of freedom when compared to interactions
using market level distributions of consumer characteristics.
Furthermore, since some of the product characteristics are unobserved (ξjt)
to us but are observed by our consumers in their choices, we use instruments
9to control for their correlation with prices and store coverage.9. The error term
²ijt (i.i.d. across products and consumers) is assumed to have a type 2 extreme
value distribution. Equation (1) shows that the indirect utility function can be
decomposed in a mean utility δjt and a deviation from the mean µijt and the
error ²ijt. This middle term represents the main diﬀerence from a basic logit
model of consumer heterogeneity. To be complete, our utility for the outside
good is written as,
ui0t = ξ0t |{z}
δ0t
+ σ0νi0 | {z }
µiot
+ ²i0t (2)
We normalize ξ0t = σ0 = 0. Finally, {α,β,σ} are the parameters of the de-
mand that are going to be estimated. The BLP speciﬁcation of demand allows
diﬀerent individuals to have diﬀerent tastes for diﬀerent product characteris-
tics. In addition, the model can allow for consumer heterogeneity in terms of
their response to prices. The random coeﬃcients are designed to capture vari-
ations in the substitution patterns. By aggregating over the error component,
one recovers a logistic form that deﬁnes the probability that individual i buys
product j in period t (fijt(·)). If we integrate out over the error distribution
of ², the following logistic (conditional on individual characteristics) probability






The next step is to aggregate over individuals and calculate each product’s
estimated market shares. The non-closed solution of this integral requires the
use of a simulation procedure. We outline computational methods in the next
section. Given the number of consumers in the economy I and integrating over
the distributions of individual characteristics, we derive each brands demand
function as,
qjt(·)=Isjt(p,x,ξ;θ), for jt ∈ Jt (4)
9In subsection 4.4 we outline the set of instruments that we use to jointly estimate demand
and supply.
103.2 Supply





≡ ln(mcjt)=wjtγ + ωjt, (5)
where we denote with w and ω respectively, the observed and unobserved
cost characteristics, and with γ the coeﬃcients to be estimated. In addition
to allowing for cost diﬀerences coming from observable product characteristics,
we also allow for product speciﬁc distribution costs. That is costs associated
with eﬀective store coverage and due to within stores inventory management.
In terms of robustness of the functional form, the key to the goodness of ﬁti s
the use of packaging by time dummies. In demand they control for the diﬀerent
seasonal cycles of brands but also the nature of the buy, impulse versus one-
stop. In cost packaging by time dummies are also very important due to the
diﬀerences in glass, plastic and aluminium inputs prices over-time.
3.3 Market Equilibrium





(pjt − mcjt)qjt (6)








=0 ,jt∈ Jft (7)
from which we get our price equilibria.






∂pjt , if brands rt,jt ∈ Jft a r ep r o d u c e db yt h es a m eﬁrm
(therefore rt,jt ∈ Jft);
0, otherwise.
(8)
which allow us to explicit the following price-cost markup
pjt = mcjt + ∆−1s | {z }
markupjt
(9)
11Our interest in substitution eﬀects, dropping the time subscript to simplify














































(b 6= j), where ni, ai, ci are, respectively, simulated values from Normal, Age
and Closeness (to shops) distributions.
4 Computational Techniques and Estimation Pro-
cedures
BLP at the product level of industry uses exogenous distributions on individual
characteristics that are at market level and, whenever disaggregated, sub-market
level speciﬁc ( Petrin (2002)). Undoubtedly a noticeable gain in eﬃciency would
be reached with individual characteristics that are product-level speciﬁc. Berry
Levinsohn and Pakes (2004) use second choice data that is product level to
gain eﬃciency. We use information on eﬀective store coverage by product to
create a distribution of consumer tastes for location. The aim is to embed this
into the BLP framework not only to gain eﬃciency, but also to introduce a
dimension of product diﬀerentiation that was previously omitted. This is the
main contribution of our paper.
4.1 The Distribution of Consumer Distance to the Nearest
Shop Carrying Product j
Product j may either be distributed in the nearest shop to consumer i or,
our consumer may be forced go travel to ﬁnd the product. In our simulations
(see subsection 4.2) we associate a generic disutility to consumers not ﬁnding
12a product available in their nearest shop. By randomizing over eﬀective store
coverage by product j we create a distribution of consumers with and without
disutility resulting from each brand’s location across retail stores. Since a store,
weighted by size, locates where the market is, not covering a store clearly creates
distance to a brand for consumers in this catchment area. Our distribution
reﬂects a probability distribution of consumers that ﬁnd the brand in their
nearest shop and others will not and incur disutility. One could try to back
out the nature of transportation costs or the number of stores to be searched
before ﬁnding the product. Yet, empirically we ﬁnd it is enough to allow for a
probability distribution of consumers with and without a location disutility for
each product.
Example 1 This provides an example of how the distribution is created. Each
shop is either ﬁlled up with all the products or with just a subset of the available
set of products. Let’s assume a market that hosts 3 products {a,b,c} and 4
individuals {I,II,III,IV}. We can map our idea of distance into the following
matrix (where 1 stands for the availability of the product in a consumer’s nearest
store):
j\i I II III IV
a 10 0 0.25
b 11 0 0.50
c 11 1 1 1
From the matrix we see that product a has low coverage, product b medium
coverage and product c full coverage of consumers. Our version of shop coverage
assumes individuals can either ﬁnd products without travel costs (closest shop)
w h i c hw ed e n o t ea s1, or not, which we denote as 0. In the example individual I
ﬁnds all three products in her nearest shop and she can (without transportation
costs) choose among them. Individual II only ﬁnds two products in her closest
shop (products b and product c) and is required to go to another shop to ﬁnd
product a. Finally, individuals III and IV just ﬁnd product c in their nearest
shop, and have to travel for products a and b. This disutility for travelling has
of course a direct impact in the choice of products individuals have.10 We use
10Let’s start with an ideal situation (for consumer I) where the nearest shop to individual
I sells all diﬀerent products and that individual I prefers product a. Suppose now product a
is no longer available in that shop and individual I is asked to ﬁnd the product in another
shop. Three possible situations araise:
i) individual I prefers product a even though she has to go to buy it into another shop;
ii) individual I prefers another product 6= a available in the closest shop;
iii) individual I prefers not to buy any product (prefers the outside option).
13information on eﬀective shop coverage to generate simulations on the availability
of products in each consumer’s nearest shop (our Closeness distribution C). We
discuss our simulations in the next subsection.
4.2 Simulations
Our individuals have their own age, a personal taste, and get disutility from
the lack of product j in their nearest shops.11 An individual, based on his own
characteristics, has therefore a personal perception of the average quality in the
market (a benchmark quality) and his own sensitivity to a price change. Since
one of the individual attributes that we control for is age, we expect an old
age person to have a lower perception of quality and be more sensitive to a
price change. We simulate individual i in period t to be a random draw from
a multivariate distribution νit =[ Ni1t,A i1t,D i1t;Ni2t,A i2t,D i2t].12 Subscripts
1,2 denote individual reaction to a benchmark quality and to the price of the
products, respectively. We remind N, A and D to stand, respectively, for draws
from a Normal, Age and Closeness distribution. A simplifying assumption is
these distributions to be all independent from each other.
The following details the individual attributes that deﬁne our simulations;
• We know the numerations of 5-year classes of age (Figure II) for the 1995
Irish population. We use this information to recover the corresponding
Age distributions. 13 We then generate ns numbers from a [0,1] uniform
distribution and, each period, associate these numbers to the diﬀerent
intervals of our age distribution. We replace these numbers with one
of the ages (randomly chosen) within the corresponding class. In our
estimates we normalize age to the maximum age of 100 and demean our
age distribution.
• We have information on the (weighted) average shop coverage of product
j which assumes values in the interval [0,1]. We deﬁne distance (dist)a s
one minus eﬀective store coverage. In our estimates we use as means of
11We refer to Nevo (2000, 2001) for further details on simulations over diﬀerent individual
characteristics.
12In order to avoid problems in our minimization procedure we censor our multinormal
distribution to 99%.
13Since the age distribution is almost unchanged in a ﬁve-year period, we recover individual
variability by just shifting this distribution over time.
14our binomials the following normalization of our distance measure
log(dist)
log(dist)+l o g ( 1− dist)
(11)
Figure III shows how our normalization maps distance into a non-linear
function of shop coverage. This normalization is aimed to give more weights to
higher coverage products which may be thought of as a bonus to higher coverage
products. For each product j we draw ns {0,1} values from a binomial having
our mean deﬁn e di n( 1 1 ) . 14 A value of one stands for an individual who ﬁnds
the product in his nearest shop. In our estimates we demean our Closeness
distribution.
• Finally, we ﬁnish our genome by giving each individual a speciﬁct a s t e .
We draw ns values from a Normal distribution assuming individuals have
diﬀerent perceptions of quality. We also assume ns individuals from a log-
normal distribution (properly demeaned) assuming all individuals dislike
prices.
The entity we simulate is an individual described by a 3−uple of attributes
(Age, Taste, Closeness).
As in BLP we obtain our market shares in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage
we integrate out over the distribution of ² and obtain the following logistic






where δjt is the mean utility and µijt the deviations from the mean (1).
The above function can be read as the probability of individual i to buy product
j in period t. In the second stage, we aggregate (each period/market) over the





14Suppose brand j is present in 80% of shops (weighted by sales). This leads to a value of
shop coverage for brand j and mean of our binomial of 0.8. In this case our ns simulations
associated to brand j will give about 80% of ones and 20% of zeros.
15where P0 is the population. The non closed solution of (13) requires a simulation
procedure. An immediate simulation procedure simply requires one to replace










Product j in period t market share is therefore approximated by the average
individual probabilities.The next step is to recover the mean utility component
(δjt). Since it is not possible to recover (δjt) analytically, we use (as in BLP) a
contraction mapping operator,
T(Snt,Pnst;θ) [δjt] ' δjt +l n( sjt) − ln[sjt(·)] (15)
where θ includes all the parameters that determine the impact of the distribution
of consumer characteristics {α,σ} as well as the product characteristics, the
utility parameters that describe the utility surface β and the marginal costs γ.
We partition θ in θ = {θ1,θ2} where θ1 = {β,γ} is the subset of parameters
that come out of our objective function and θ2 = {α,σ} the parameters that
enter our objective function.16 Snt is the set of market shares we observe and
Pnst is the empirical distribution of ns drawn from a P0 population.
Once computed the mean utilities δjt(·) we can back out our demand unob-
servables,
ξjt = δjt(·;θ2) − xjtb β (16)
and, using the pricing equation (9), back out the supply unobservables,
ωjt =l n( mcjt(·;θ2)) − wjtb γ. (17)






= E [ωj (·;θ0)|z] = 0 (18)
15Of course, we need ns diﬀerent draws for each market t ∈ T.I no u rs i m u l a t i o n sns =1 0 0 .
16It is possible in this way to separate the set of parameters that enter linearly in our
estimations from those that enter non linearly. This let us to use a two step non linear GMM
procedure. See Hayashi (2000) for a good reference on GMM.
16with z =[ x,w] our demand and supply observed product characteristics and
θ0 the true parameters value. We make use of the non linear Nelder-Mead pro-
cedure (see Lagarias et al, 1998) to minimize a norm of the non linear GMM
function (Hansen, 1982) generated by our imposed moments’ condition.17 Fi-
nally, we have all the tools necessary to describe the steps of our computation
procedure (iteration numbers are denoted by subscribed squared brackets):
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(14). Use the obtained market shares (14)





2 Repeat step 1) (where θ2 is always ﬁxed at the starting value θ2[0])u n t i l





≡ e δ then, simultaneously estimate \ {β,γ} (see 16 and
17) and get the residuals ξ and ω.18
3 Apply the Nelder-Mead ﬁxed point minimization to the norm of the non
linear GMM function and output d θ2[1].
Repeat steps 1) and 2) above until the Nelder-Mead procedure converges.19.
4.3 Computing a New Equilibrium
One motivation to estimate structural models is that one can not only under-
stand how the market works (undertake a positive analysis from the estimation
of the primitives of the model) but, most importantly, predict how the market
will change as a function of changes in exogenous conditions. This process of
comparative statics requires re-computing the underlying equilibrium. In our
analysis we have so far assumed the existence of an equilibrium (the one ob-
served in the market) and, given that equilibrium, we have computed the set
17In our estimates we correct for potential correlation between demand and supply unob-
servables.





19We have implemented all our algorithms in Matlab. A Matlab version of the algorithms
to estimate the demand side of a random coeﬃcient model is available at the Aviv Nevo’s
homepage, http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/nevo/. We have extended those original ﬁles to
our demand and supply version.
17of the optimal parameters to be used for backing out the primitives of the un-
derlying model. Our interest in providing a counterfactual pushes us to go one
step further and compute the equilibrium that should follow a particular ex-
ogenous shock. Re-computing an equilibrium can be a simple exercise in the
case of a small number of ﬁrms and linear demand and marginal cost functions.
Re-computing an equilibrium gets far more complicated when demand is not
linear (marginal costs are backed out through the Lerner index) and ﬁrms are
multiproduct. No analytical solution then exists. This complexity pushes us to
discover an algorithm that solves for the new equilibrium. To our knowledge the
previous empirical industrial organization literature dealing with comparative
statics has avoided these diﬃculties either by assuming particular structures to
avoid the eﬀect of the strong interdependence among ﬁrms (brands), or evaluat-
ing the eﬀect of exogenous changes using the primitives from the old equilibrium
(Lucas Critique) .
We propose a method to re-compute a new equilibrium in a general setting
where ﬁrms are multiproduct, demand functions are non-linear, marginal costs
are backed out from the augmented Lerner index, and there is no analytical solu-
tion. We propose a two stage procedure that particular suits our counterfactual
based on a change in the distribution of consumer characteristics that does not
aﬀect the short run conﬁguration of the cost function.20 We use the augmented
Lerner index (the augmented elasticity rule) to back-out the new prices (and
quantities) of equilibrium. What happens is that although the shock in the
distribution of consumer characteristics does not aﬀect directly our short- run
conﬁguration of cost function it does, however, create inequalities through its
propagation via the markup leading to:
c mc T mc(·)=p − mup(·) (19)
where c mc is the originally estimated marginal cost and mc(p,mup(p,s(p,·),·,;θ))
the new marginal cost after the exogenous shock took place. Clearly, mc is a
function of prices and market shares, given other product characteristics and
the parameters of the model. The basic idea is to ﬁnd the price vector that
brings marginal costs back to their previously estimated (actual) value. The
full procedure is simply the following constrained proﬁt maximising nonlinear
20If the shock is on the supply side an extension of the procedure only requires to compute
ﬁrst of all the new marginal costs from the optimal parameters. These newly computed
marginal costs would represent the estimated marginal costs reported in the main text.
18programming problem.
max
p π =( p − mc)q (20)
s.t. mc(·)=c mc
p ≥ 0
In order to compute the new equilibrium we develop a two stage search algo-
rithm that numerically solves this constrained maximization and deals with the
complexity of mc(·). The underlying environment foresees that ﬁrms (brands)
face the decision of which optimal price to set after the exogenous shock has
been realized. We are interested in the dynamics towards the new equilibrium.
Firms can start the process of changing prices to converge to the new price equi-
librium in the market. Changes in prices are associated with, via the Lerner
index, new marginal costs. Unfortunately changes in marginal costs due their
























We are aware of the price interdependence with other ﬁrms and but are
unaware of the sign of the markup substitution eﬀect. However we observe
(estimated) marginal costs and are aware that the right change in prices should
give the ﬁrm, predictions of marginal cost, via the learner index, that are equal
to the old (estimated) value of marginal costs that preceded the exogenous
shock. The algorithm that we propose is the following:
Stage one: Nature randomly chooses the set of brands to start with positive or nega-
tive price changes.21 After nature has selected the ﬁrst movement of the
brands, she checks whether brands have mc() not converging to c mc.L e t ’ s
call these brands the oﬀ-side ones. Nature brings back the oﬀ-side brands
and, randomly, selects the new movements imposing, this time, the rule
that only a lower change in prices (whether positive or negative is dictated
by the new selection of the Nature) is possible. Nature therefore punishes
the noise created in the system by the oﬀ-side brands. Nature keeps on
selecting until all brands are moving on-side.
21Firms toss a coin in order to decide whether to raise or lower their prices.
19Stage two: Given that all brands are on-side, the process of convergence is evaluated.
If all brands have a marginal cost, backed out of a system of Lerner in-
dexes, close enough to their actual (estimated) marginal costs the program
converges and the obtained prices represent the new equilibrium; if not,
the program starts again repeating stage one, keeping track of the old
prices (and updated quantities) generated at the end of the previous stage
one.
Uniqueness is guaranteed if we have quasiconcavity in the proﬁt functions
and quasiconvexity in the constraints evaluated at the new price and quan-
tity outcomes holding the parameters of the surface of the utility and cost
function constant, as well as the distribution of product characteristics
constant.
4.4 Instruments
A heated debate in the GMM techniques is the choice of optimal instruments.
Chamberlain (1986) shows the eﬃcient set of instruments to be equal to the con-
ditional expectation of the derivative of the conditional moment condition with
respect to the parameter vector. Unfortunately this conditional expectation is
very diﬃcult, if not impossible, to compute. We suggest a simpler method based
on the goodness of the ﬁt. Our method computes a R2 for demand and supply,
we choose the set of instruments that provides higher eﬃciency (higher R2).
Our optimal choice of the instruments is also supported by economic arguments
which is outlined in the next subsection.
4.4.1 Demand and Supply Side Instruments
We list and explain the instruments used in our demand and supply estimations.
In particular, in demand we allow price, consumer taste for location distribution
and interaction with price to be endogenous. On the demand side we need cost
shifters that explain price and product speciﬁc location that are independent of
the demand unobservable.
a) The product characteristics
b) Inventories deﬁned as the number of days to stock out on day of audit
given the current rate of sales during the bi-monthly period. Stock-outs
do not exist in the data. We interpret inventories as a way to reduce
20transportation or the distribution costs associated with deliveries. We see
it as a cost shifter. This measurement of inventories should not respond
to factors observable to the consumer but not the econometrician (e.g.
product promotions). See discussion of table 3 in data section.
c) Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) as-
sume systematic cost factors are common across segments Thus the prices
of a ﬁrm’s products in other segments, after the elimination of segment
and ﬁrm eﬀects, are driven by common underlying costs correlated with
brand price, but uncorrelated with the product speciﬁcd i s t u r b a n c e si n
demand and can be used as an instrument. Such a cost shifter proves a
good instrument for price.
d) We also use non-price Hausman and Taylor (1981) instruments, where the
average eﬀective coverage of stores and inventory levels by ﬁrms brands
in other segments are instruments in a deﬁned segment. This captures
potential cost gains from economies of scope in retail distribution. This
is a good instrument for the distribution of consumer taste for location,
constructed from the eﬀective store coverage of a product.
e) BLP type instruments: the average and the standard deviation of eﬀective
coverage of stores and inventories by other ﬁrms within the segment (and
outside the segment) of the brand in question. The idea here is that
distribution structures of other brands determine the equilibrium short-
run pricing within the segment, which is a good instrument for price.
On the supply side we need instruments for eﬀective store coverage that
are independent of the cost unobservable. We use the above a) product
characteristics, b) inventories and e) BLP type instruments. The most
likely unobservable is the marginal cost of brand speciﬁc advertising, as
we control for ﬁrm attachment eﬀects. We drop the price and non-price
Hausman and Taylor (1981) instruments, cost shifters and only use the
BLP instruments as demand shifters. Clearly, distribution structures of
other brands determine the equilibrium short-run pricing within the seg-
ment and we use them as demand shifters to identify the cost function.
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The results from jointly estimating the demand and cost equations are presented
in Table 4. The standard errors have been corrected for potential correlation
between demand and supply unobservables. We provide estimates for the pa-
rameters of the indirect utility and cost functions. With reference to utility,
we estimate the mean eﬀect of our product characteristics (including price) and
the parameters that deﬁne individual variability towards a benchmark quality
and prices. Our speciﬁcation of the utility and cost function, choices of demand
and supply side instruments and our structural model of equilibrium produce
good results. The model is simulated to explains 85 per cent of the variation
in market share and 75 per cent of the variation in marginal cost across brands
and time. In addition, the choice of instruments sets for demand and supply
seem to be correct given the value of the GMM objective function.22.
It is important that we get good estimates of the demand primitives. The
coeﬃcient on price and interaction of price with consumer taste distributions
will be the focal point. Yet, it will be the quality of the other controls and
the instrument set that will give us the ability to obtain eﬃcient estimates of
our coeﬃcients on price and interactions with price. We address these control
variables ﬁrst. In terms of the utility function we see that only Orange and
Mixed Fruit give higher utility than Cola. Regular sweeter has the advantage
over diet. Packaging formats, Cans, 2-litre and Multi-pack seem less popular
compared to Standard and 1.5 litre formats. Yet we have extensive packaging
by season dummies included. Though not reported the importance of packaging
does switch by season. Cans become more important in the summer months
and 2-litre is popular during the Christmas period. On average, Standard and
1.5 litre formats have the advantage.
We interact the market level and product level consumer taste distributions
with the constant. The unobserved taste structures of consumers that dictate
whether they choose the outside good, or not, and the observed taste structure
22In terms of robustness of functional forms, the key to the goodness of ﬁti st h eu s eo f
packaging by time dummies. In demand they control for the diﬀerent seasonal cycles of
brands but also the nature of the the buy, impluse versus one-stop. The interactions of
Closeness to Stores distribution with the constant and price come in with and without the
other interactions terms reported. Packaging by time dummies are also very important in cost
due to the diﬀerences in using glass, plastic and aluminium inputs and their pricing over-time.
The nature of distribution costs is also an important part of costs functional form.
22in terms of age are signiﬁcant. The product level consumer taste distributions
that reﬂect consumer distance to the nearest store that carries the brand are
highly signiﬁcant. Brands with good coverage of consumers, via eﬀective store
coverage, have signiﬁcantly higher demand over other products inside the market
and relative to the outside option.
We now turn to our estimates of our coeﬃcient on price and the interaction
of price with our consumer taste distributions. The coeﬃcients on price and
its interaction with taste distributions that reﬂect consumer taste for closeness
are highly signiﬁcant. The market level consumer taste distributions interaction
with price are not signiﬁcant. This will imply that own- and cross-price elas-
ticities will be more responsive when the distribution of consumers distance to
stores by product reﬂect good eﬀective store coverage. We see clearly a trade
oﬀ between covering the market and the nature of price competition that a
brand faces. Less coverage is not a good attribute in terms of market share, but
can potentially lead to higher price cost mark-ups by making own- and cross-
price elasticities less responsive. Even though the market level interactions do
not come in, we will see that our product level consumer taste distribution for
geography will have an impact on demand primitives.
T h ed e g r e eo fe ﬀective store coverage is also an important determinant of
brand marginal cost. Marginal cost is increasing with market coverage and
decreasing in inventories (controlling inversely for delivery costs to the shops you
are in). Brands in 2-litre packaging or multi-packs seem to have lower marginal
costs than cans. The production of standard and 1.5 litre formats seems more
costly. Lemonade seems to have higher and Mixed Fruit lower marginal costs
than either Cola or Orange.
In summary, distributions of consumer taste for product location and it’s
interaction with price in utility and eﬀective store coverage in cost would have
been an important omitted variables. In addition, information on product spe-
ciﬁc store coverage has been a great source of BLP type instruments in our
estimation routine. Yet, how empirically important is product diﬀerentiation
coming from consumer taste for location in terms of the demand primitives?
We document this in tables 5, 6 and 7 averaging over brands to the Company
and Segment level. Given the heterogeneity in brand market coverage within
Companies and Segments, we also present the demand primitives for brands with
less than (or equal) or greater than 50 per cent of the market covered. What is
23clear from table 5 is that brands belonging to companies with low market cov-
erage tend to have lower own- and sum of cross- price elasticities. To see that
this results from the partial eﬀect of consumer tastes for product location on
the demand primitives, we simulate the eﬀect of a 1 per cent increase in market
coverage (hence changing the consumer taste distributions) on the primitives,
holding the parameter set and all other variables constant (including market
shares and prices). We see clearly that the own- and sum of cross-price elas-
ticities become more elastic in response to such an exogenous change in the
product level consumer taste for location distributions. This is more pronouced
for brands with lower market coverage. This results from our normalization
of the mapping of distance into a non linear function of market coverage (see
Figure III). This normalization is aimed to give more weight to higher coverage
products, however increases in market coverage beneﬁt the low coverage prod-
ucts more. In tables 6 and 7 we undertake the same analysis by our regular and
diet segments respectively. The 2 liters and mutlipack brands, across ﬂavour and
sweetener segments, have relatively inelastic and similar primitives by market
coverage. In contrast, brands packaged by cans or standard packaging, across
ﬂavour and sweetener segments, tend to have inelastic primitives as a result of
low coverage and relatively elastic with high coverage. Again we simulate the
eﬀect of a 1 per cent increase in market coverage, changing the consumer taste
distributions for product location, on the primitives, holding the parameter set
and all other variables constant. This isolates the eﬀect of market coverage. We
see clearly that the own- and sum of cross-price elasticities become more elastic
and this is more pronouced for brands with lower market coverage in cans and
standard format. In summary, packaging and the consumer taste distribution
for product location are important and interesting determinants of the demand
primitives. Packaging and distribution costs are also important interesting and
important determinants of the cost primitives.
5.1 Market Power
Given the primitives by brand/product we should not be surprised with the
estimates of the Lerner index that the structural model produces. Aggregating
to the company and segment level, we calculate the price cost mark-ups and
proﬁts by market coverage in the last bi-monthly period. Clearly, in table 8, a
monotonic relationship between market power and market share does not exist
24at the company level in this industry. There is a clear premium for brands that
operate in a small subset of the stores. Brands of companies with a smaller
market share and coverage of the CSD market can extract rents within the
product segments and stores of the market they operate in that are comparable
to any brand of greater size or market coverage. Its seems that inferring market
power from the distribution of market shares is ill advised in multi-product
ﬁrms diﬀerentiated goods industries. In tables 9 and 10 we document the price
cost mark-ups, among other factors, by ﬂavor and packaging in regular and
diet segments, respectively. Mark-ups (proﬁts) are clearly higher in certain
packaging types. It is within these segments that we observe diﬀerent degrees
of market power, and not at the company level. Mark-ups are clearly higher
in the 2 litre and in cans multi-packs whose main market is large chain stores.
T h ed e g r e eo fe ﬀective store coverage does not eﬀect market power is the same
way as observed in cans and standard packaging. Clearly, brands in cans and
standard packaging that target a smaller set of shops has lead to higher mark-
ups. Packaging matters. We feel that this reﬂects store type (chain versus small
stores) and nature of buy (impulse versus one-stop).
5.2 Counterfactual
In a counterfactual exercise, holding the parameters of the surface of the util-
ity and cost function constant and the distribution of product characteristics
constant, we examine the eﬀects on welfare in an equilibrium that results from
a change in the distribution of consumer taste for location distributions. By
holding marginal costs ﬁxed we reduce the simulated numbers of consumers
having disutility of not having the products in their nearest shop by expanding
eﬀective store coverage for each product by one per cent. The numerical method
that solved for a new equilibrium in prices and market shares for each brand,
ﬁxing marginal cost and the parameter set, was outlined in section 4. This is
a non-trivial exercise and is an important innovation of this paper. One mo-
tivation for estimating the parameters of the utility and cost function, within
a structural model, with as much ﬂexibility (non-linearity) in functional forms
as possible, is that it allows one to undertake policy experiments (counterfactu-
als). Yet if researchers have problems simulating a new equilibrium in price and
quantity outcomes due to the nature of the functional forms (the presence of
nonlinearities) this goes against the key objective of having a structural model.
25We introduce a numerical method that allows the structural model to forecast
the eﬀect of a policy change by allowing convergence to a new equilibrium in
prices and market shares for all brands and consumers. BLP avoid the issue by
undertaking a counterfactural out of sample. Nevo (2000), ﬁxing the demand
primitives at the old equilibrium, focuses on which structural models of pricing
predicts observable marginal costs the best. This again avoids having demand
primitives changing in response to a policy change and the need to move to a
new optimal vector of prices and consumer demands.
In tables 11, 12 and 13 we see the results of our counterfactual. Bringing
consumers closer to the market for all brands induces all own- and cross-price
elasticities in the new equilibrium to become more elastic. We see this at the
company and segment level. If we compare these primitives to those in tables
5, 6, and 7 (where no brand could respond with a price change or where no
consumer could change their product choice) we see much bigger increases in
the own and cross-price elasticities in the new equilibrium.
In tables 15, 16 and 17 we compare welfare before and after the experiment.
Inside the market, increases in the own- and cross-price elasticities in the new
equilibrium increase price competition but this also induces an expansion eﬀect
that brings consumers in from consuming the outside good. This has the eﬀect
of expanding demand from an inside market share of 62 to 70 per cent. Overall
the expansion eﬀect oﬀsets the eﬀects of increased price competition and re-
sults in an increase in aggregate consumer and producer surplus. In tables 16
and 17, even though aggregate producer surplus increases, we see winners and
losers across the segments by market coverage. Brands with low market cov-
erage tended to be winners and brands with high coverage tended to be losers
within segments as a result of the change in the consumer taste for location
distributions. In the new equilibrium the shock to demand generated bigger
quantity than price adjustments.
5.3 Conclusion
This paper highlights the role of location in retail markets. Using data for
the retail CSD market we demonstrate clear eﬃciency gains in the estimation
of demand and cost primitives, using the BLP estimation routine, by allowing
consumers to have preferences over location and products to carry distribu-
tion costs, alongside preferences and costs associated with other observable and
26unobservable product characteristics.
In addition, we highlight the role of packaging. We see clear diﬀerences in
demand primitives and mark-ups by market coverage across packaging formats.
In demand, in the case of the cans and standard format, packaging type reﬂects
impulse buys across small stores. In the 2 litres or multi-pack cans format
packaging reﬂects one-stop buys in supermarket. In cost, packaging controls
for the nature of costs in terms of glass, plastic and aluminium input prices.
Mark-ups are clearly higher in the 2 litre and in cans multi-packs whose main
market is large chain stores. In addition, the degree of eﬀective store coverage
does not eﬀect market power is the same way as observed in cans and standard
packaging.
As a counterfactual exercise, we show the eﬀects on welfare of an equilib-
rium that results from increasing the simulated numbers of consumers that have
access to products in their nearest store, by expanding eﬀective store coverage
for each product by one per cent. We introduce a numerical method that al-
lows the structural model to forecast prices and market shares for all brands in
the new equilibrium resulting form this change in the distribution of consumer
characteristics. While increases in the own- and cross-price elasticities in the
new equilibrium increases the intensity of price competition in the inside market
we also see a large market expansion eﬀect as consumers come in from consum-
ing the outside good. Overall, consumer and producer surplus both increase,
highlighting the potential role of general equilibrium considerations in industry
counterfactuals.
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30Table 1: Number of Brands (B) and Store Coverage (SC) within Segments, averaged 
Oct.92-May 97 
 Cans 
  B      SC 
Standard 
B      SC 
1.5 Litre 
B      SC 
2 Litre 
B      SC 
MultipkCans
B      SC 
Regular Cola   1     0.99  2     0.83  1     0.90  1     0.78  2     0.53 
Regular Orange  2     0.74  1     0.41  2     0.48  2     0.52  2     0.42 
Regular Lemonade  2     0.94  3     0.62  2     0.93  2     0.75  2     0.41 
Regular Mixed Fruit  2     0.75  2     0.59  1     0.48  2     0.51  1     0.13 
Diet Cola  2     0.88  1     0.82  2     0.80  2     0.64  2     0.46 
Diet Orange  1     0.10     0        0  1     0.38      0     
Diet Lemonade  2     0.97  1     0.51  2     0.87  2     0.68  2     0.38 
Diet Mixed Fruit  1     0.37      0    1     0.10  1     0.38      0  
Coca Cola Bottlers:   Segments Covered = 35/40                                  Number of Brands = 52 
Regular Cola   2     0.86  3     0.60  1     0.42  2     0.54  2     0.39 
Regular Orange  2     0.93  2     0.70  1     0.76  1     0.61  1     0.43 
Regular Lemonade     0       0     0     0       0  
Regular Mixed Fruit  1     0.92  4     0.70  2     0.49  2     0.75      0  
Diet Cola  2     0.64  1     0.20  2     0.13  2     0.42  1     0.32 
Diet Orange  2     0.70     1      0.23       1     0.46  1     0.52      0     
Diet Lemonade     0       0     0     0       0  
Diet Mixed Fruit     0      1      0.37      0     0       0  
C & C:                        Segments Covered = 24/40                                  Number of Brands = 45 
Regular Cola   3     0.22  3     0.60  1     0.14  2     0.62  1     0.03 
Regular Orange  2     0.44  5     0.71  2     0.56  2     0.69  1     0.06 
Regular Lemonade  2     0.27  3     0.76  2     0.19  2     0.75      0    
Regular Mixed Fruit  3     0.76  9     0.86  4     0.49  3     0.55      0  
Diet Cola  1     0.06  1     0.01  1     0.05  1     0.02      0 
Diet Orange     0       0     0     0       0  
Diet Lemonade     0       0     0     0       0  
Diet Mixed Fruit  1     0.21     1     0.20     0     0       0  
Others:                         Segments Covered = 24/40                                  Number of Brands = 59 
 
31Table 2: Segments Quantity and Price Levels, Oct’92 prices, averaged Oct.92-May 97 










Cola Can   6  5 1.43  1486.39 4.22  2115.8 8.018 
Cola Standard  11  5 1.26  1333.49 3.78  1691.9 6.411 
Cola  1.5 litre  3  3 0.75 892.60  2.53  671.6  2.545 
Cola  2 litre  5  4 0.50  3866.89 10.97 1945.0 7.371 
Cola Can Multipacks   5  2 0.96 677.80  1.92  648.4  2.457 
Orange Can   6  4 1.38 653.39  1.85  886.7  3.360 
Orange Standard  10  6 1.27 741.43  2.10  931.1  3.528 
Orange  1.5 litre  5  4 0.68 781.34  2.22  535.0  2.027 
Orange  2 litre  5  4 0.46  3000.27 8.51  1382.2 5.238 
Orange  Can Multipacks   3  3 0.97 174.02  0.49  170.0  0.644 
Lemonade Can   4  2 1.41 498.02  1.41  698.9  2.649 
Lemonade Standard  5  2 1.16 487.17  1.38  569.3  2.158 
Lemonade 1.5 litre  3  2 0.71  1322.93 3.75  939.4  3.560 
Lemonade  2 litre  4  2 0.47  4140.18 11.75 1940.7 7.354 
Lemonade Can Multipacks   2  1 0.97 127.93  0.36  124.2  0.471 
Mixed Fruit Can   7  5 1.39 752.36  2.13  1044.8 3.959 
Mixed Fruit Standard  19  10 1.37 2217.30  6.29  3127.8 11.853 
Mixed Fruit 1.5 litre  7  6 0.74 633.04  1.80  464.6  1.760 
Mixed Fruit  2 litre  8  6 0.41  6612.09 18.76 2634.8 9.985 
Mixed Fruit Can Multipacks   1  1  0.83  7.63 0.02  5.9 0.022 
Diet Cola Can   4  3 1.39 392.24  1.11  541.7  2.053 
Diet Cola Standard  3  3 1.30 328.14  0.93  423.8  1.606 
Diet Cola  1.5 litre  4  2 0.75 292.71  0.83  220.6  0.836 
Diet Cola  2 litre  4  3 0.55  1005.39 2.85  536.6  2.033 
Diet Cola Can Multipacks   3  2 0.96 222.27  0.63  212.9  0.807 
Diet Orange Can   2  1 1.27  82.80  0.23  105.5  0.400 
Diet Orange Standard  1  1  1.19  15.88 0.05  19.2 0.073 
Diet Orange  1.5 litre  1  1  0.71  75.52 0.21  53.9 0.204 
Diet Orange  2 litre  3  2 0.56 254.33  0.72  140.9  0.534 
Diet Lemonade Can   2  2 1.44 186.00  0.53  267.6  1.014 
Diet Lemonade Standard  1  1  1.29  75.24 0.21  95.8 0.363 
Diet Lemonade 1.5 litre  1  1 0.73 572.03  1.62  415.0  1.573 
Diet Lemonade  2 litre  2  1 0.59  1197.89 3.40  699.1  2.649 
Diet Lemonade Can Multipacks   1  1  0.96  74.21 0.21  71.3 0.270 
Diet Mixed Fruit Can   2  2  1.27  13.69 0.04  17.5 0.066 
Diet Mixed Fruit Standard  2  2  1.17  14.26 0.04  16.9 0.064 
Diet Mixed Fruit  1.5 litre  1  1  0.83  0.67 0.00  0.5 0.002 
Diet Mixed Fruit  2 litre  1  1  0.55  39.96 0.11  21.7 0.082 
Total  157  107    35249.48 100 26388.36 100 
 
32Table 3: Segments Store Coverage and Inventory Levels, May’93 (Initial), May’95 
(Middle) and May 97(End) 












Cola Can   0.95 0.93 0.94  16  16  20 
Cola Standard  0.69 0.86 0.89  18  14  16 
Cola  1.5 litre  0.84 0.84 0.81  21  16  19 
Cola  2 litre  0.68 0.74 0.79  14  12  13 
Cola Can Multipacks   0.43 0.49 0.50  16  11  11 
Orange Can   0.80 0.80 0.75  25  21  27 
Orange Standard  0.81 0.72 0.71  25  16  20 
Orange  1.5 litre  0.64 0.65 0.61  22  17  23 
Orange  2 litre  0.70 0.61 0.62  13  13  16 
Orange  Can Multipacks   0.37 0.39 0.43  19  19  14 
Lemonade Can   0.91 0.95 0.84  26  18  27 
Lemonade Standard  0.81 0.74 0.82  26  18  18 
Lemonade 1.5 litre  0.83 0.87 0.87  17  11  15 
Lemonade  2 litre  0.76 0.75 0.80  15  12  11 
Lemonade Can Multipacks   0.38 0.35 0.40  19  10  16 
Mixed Fruit Can   0.87 0.83 0.77  24  18  28 
Mixed Fruit Standard  0.92 0.80 0.76  24  17  22 
Mixed Fruit 1.5 litre  0.54 0.47 0.41  29  18  26 
Mixed Fruit  2 litre  0.68 0.65 0.64  18  10  15 
Mixed Fruit Can Multipacks   0.84 0.80 0.04  21  19  3 
Diet Cola Can   0.78 0.82 0.88  24  20  23 
Diet Cola Standard  0.55 0.76 0.89  15  23  19 
Diet Cola  1.5 litre  0.40 0.60 0.75  14  13  21 
Diet Cola  2 litre  0.69 0.41 0.68  30  10  13 
Diet Cola Can Multipacks   0.51 0.69 0.41  28  21  8 
Diet Orange Can   0.45 0.46 0.70  16  23  27 
Diet Orange Standard  0.84 0.48 0.52  24  12  22 
Diet Orange  1.5 litre  0.84 0.91 0.35  20  16  34 
Diet Orange  2 litre  0.60 0.54 0.51  13  13  15 
Diet Lemonade Can   0.35 0.85 0.90  21  15  24 
Diet Lemonade Standard  0.49 0.73 0.75  26  10  7 
Diet Lemonade 1.5 litre  0.01 0.32 0.84  3  8  16 
Diet Lemonade  2 litre  0.36 0.22 0.77  20  39  10 
Diet Lemonade Can Multipacks   0.95 0.33 0.35  16  7  13 
Diet Mixed Fruit Can   0.69 0.93 0.17  18  16  37 
Diet Mixed Fruit Standard  0.84 0.86 0.37  21  14  20 
Diet Mixed Fruit  1.5 litre  0.68 0.84 0.38  14  16  12 
Diet Mixed Fruit  2 litre  0.43 0.74 0.94  16  12  20 
         
 
33Table 4:  Estimation of Demand and Marginal Cost Equation: BLP Specification  
   Demand  Cost 
  Variables  Coefficient   (t-stat)  Coefficient   (t-stat) 
Means      
  Constant  -3.3  (1.4)      0.14  (.45) 
  Inventories        -.16   (2.1)* 
  Store Coverage        .20  (2.7)* 
  Price   -6.8  (2.9)*   
Default Cola  Orange     .71  (2.9)*  .04   (.40) 
  Lemonade   .19  (0.8)     .19   (2.2)* 
  Mixed Fruit  .74  (2.8)*    -.22   (2.0)* 
Default Cans  Standard  3.0  (4.0)*    .41   (2.5)* 
  1.5 Litre  3.1  (3.9)*     .37   (2.3)* 
  2 Litre           -.76  (1.2)*    -.71  (3.0)* 
  Multi-Pack Cans   -2.1  (3.0)*    -1.68   (3.7)* 
Default Diet  Regular   .91  (4.8)*  -.05   (.53) 
      
Interactions      
Parametric Distribution  Constant      .76  (1.7)*   
 Price  -0.19  (.18)   
 Age Distribution  Constant   -6.7  (2.7)*   
  Price  -5.8  (.53)   
“Closeness to Stores” Distribution  Constant      18.9  (5.5)*   
 Price  -8.8    (3.3)*   
R
2
    .85 0.75 
# Negative Predicted Mark-Ups      0 
GMM Objective    .0076   
# of Simulations    100   
Company Dummies    Yes  Yes 
Packaging X Time Dummies    Yes  Yes 
Observations   4,645  4,645 
Instruments for demand regression: Flavor, Packaging and Diet characteristics and inventories; 
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables (brands of the same firm in other segments) with 
respect to price, store coverage and inventories; BLP instruments (brands of the other firms in 
the same and others segment) with respect the average and Standard Deviation of store 
coverage and inventories.  Instruments for supply regression the same as demand, expect we 
drop the Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables. 
 
34Table 5: Company Level, Own Price and Sum of Cross Price Elasticties (last period). 










Coca Cola  33  0.22  <0.5  -7.39 4.99 -7.68 5.23 
 23  0.80  >  0.5  -9.86 6.44 -9.88 6.45 
C&C 20  0.24  <0.5  -7.64 5.35 -8.07 5.45 
 21  0.72 > 0.5  -10.01  6.54  -10.05  6.55 
All Others  37  0.12  <0.5  -7.00 4.16 -7.66 4.91 
 20  0.67  >  0.5  -8.54 6.23 -8.56 6.27 
All Others         
Rank 3  11  0.15  <0.5  -6.25 4.50 -6.33 4.59 
 9  0.66  >  0.5  -7.21 6.12 -7.22 6.18 
Rank 4   4  0.15  <0.5  -8.47 4.54 -9.13 4.65 
 3  0.59  >  0.5  -8.06 6.21 -8.10 6.34 
Rank 5  3  0.12  <0.5  -3.73 2.64 -3.74 2.79 
 1  0.57  >  0.5  -3.68 5.44 -3.68 5.34 
Rank 6  3  0.11  <0.5  -8.22 4.26 -8.16 6.79 
 1  0.56  >  0.5  -3.36 5.47 -3.38 5.47 
Rank 7  2  0.29  <0.5  -14.50 6.93 -14.77 7.39 
 2  0.96 > 0.5  -18.15  7.10  -18.21  7.18 
Rank 8  3  0.12 <0.5  -8.11  4.63  -12.11  5.81 
 4  0.66  >  0.5  -9.60 6.46 -9.60 6.48 
Rank 9  6  0.04  <0.5  -3.99 2.07 -8.15 5.80 
Rank 10  1  0.19  <0.5  -11.08 6.74 -11.77 7.28 
Rank 11  2  0.02  <0.5  -8.51 3.14 -8.44 3.13 
Rank 12  1  0.23  <0.5  -12.17 6.27 -12.34 6.51 
Rank 13  1  0.04  <0.5  -2.84 1.09 -2.99 1.10 
*Simulated elasticities after a one per cent increase in market coverage. 
35Table 6: Segment Level, Own Price and Sum of Cross Price Elasticties (last period). 










Cola Can   3  0.10 <0.5  -7.96  5.14  -12.11  5.59 
  3  0.90  >  0.5  -13.57 6.88 -13.61 6.86 
Cola Standard  7  0.02 <0.5  -3.21  1.47  -6.06  2.61 
  4  0.74  >  0.5  -11.75 6.80 -11.79 6.81 
Cola  1.5 litre  2  0.18 <0.5  -4.20  3.62  -4.30  3.65 
  1  0.84 > 0.5  -7.38  6.12  -7.39  6.22 
Cola  2 litre  1  0.10 <0.5  -5.22  1.58  -5.43  6.42 
  4  0.65 > 0.5  -4.64  5.59  -4.73  5.69 
Cola Can Multipacks   4  0.30 <0.5  -8.20  5.05  -8.22  5.13 
 1  0.54 > 0.5  -8.05  6.44  -8.12  6.54 
Orange Can   4  0.19 <0.5  -9.50  5.35  -9.52  5.46 
  2  0.84  >  0.5  -13.56 7.03 -13.60 7.97 
Orange Standard  6  0.11 <0.5  -7.22  3.39  -10.54  5.92 
  4  0.73  >  0.5  -11.80 6.81 -11.80 6.85 
Orange  1.5 litre  3  0.33 <0.5  -6.74  6.18  -6.84  6.95 
  2  0.67 > 0.5  -6.83  6.11  -6.85  6.22 
Orange  2 litre  1  0.13 <0.5  -5.21  6.73  -5.46  6.51 
  4  0.63 > 0.5  -4.94  5.66  -4.96  5.65 
Orange  Can Multipacks   3  0.42  <0.5  -10.40 6.66 -10.31 6.70 
Lemonade Can   3  0.04 <0.5  -3.51  2.88  -7.43  4.09 
  1  0.87  >  0.5  -14.09 6.96 -14.09 7.02 
Lemonade Standard  2  0.05 <0.5  -8.02  3.59  -7.54  3.75 
  3  0.76  >  0.5  -11.09 6.73 -11.10 6.74 
Lemonade 1.5 litre  2  0.05 <0.5  -6.26  4.14  -6.69  4.96 
  1  0.90 > 0.5  -7.08  6.13  -7.09  6.18 
Lemonade  2 litre  1  0.04 <0.5  -5.31  6.32  -5.25  5.62 
  3  0.70 > 0.5  -4.02  5.57  -4.03  5.58 
Lemonade Can Multipacks   2  0.20 <0.5  -5.95  3.79  -5.96  3.92 
Mixed Fruit Can   4  0.23  <0.5  -12.73 6.98 -12.87 6.73 
  3  0.78  >  0.5  -13.34 6.96 -13.36 7.01 
Mixed Fruit Standard  10  0.16 <0.5  -7.44  3.73  -9.05  5.36 
  9  0.79  >  0.5  -13.08 6.88 -13.12 6.86 
Mixed Fruit 1.5 litre  6  0.27 <0.5  -6.73  5.68  -7.26  6.68 
  1  0.74 > 0.5  -7.21  6.23  -7.21  6.13 
Mixed Fruit  2 litre  2  0.33 <0.5  -4.80  5.50  -4.75  5.87 
  6  0.61 > 0.5  -4.48  5.63  -4.49  5.60 
Mixed Fruit Can Multipacks   1  0.04 < 0.5  -7.85  3.28  -7.82  7.09 
*Simulated elasticities after a one per cent increase in market coverage.  
36Table 7:  Segment Level, Own Price and Sum of Cross Price Elasticties (last period). 










Cola Can   2  0.18  <0.5  -5.70 4.01 -5.76 4.94 
  2  0.76 > 0.5  -13.43  6.95  -13.53  6.96 
Cola Standard  1  0.38  <0.5  -12.15 6.81 -12.11 6.96 
  1  0.91 > 0.5  -12.50  6.86  -12.54  6.85 
Cola  1.5 litre  3  0.02  <0.5  -3.64 1.55 -3.50 2.30 
  1  0.76 > 0.5  -7.30  6.26  -7.33  6.34 
Cola  2 litre  3  0.29  <0.5  -3.95 4.16 -4.82 6.56 
  1  0.74 > 0.5  -5.24  5.78  -5.26  5.59 
Cola Can Multipacks   3  0.36  <0.5  -10.22 6.29 -10.41 6.39 
Orange Can   1  0.70 > 0.5  -12.03  6.78  -12.09  7.02 
Orange Standard  1  0.52 > 0.5  -11.77  7.00  -11.87  6.83 
Orange  1.5 litre  1  0.35  <0.5  -7.02 6.28 -7.05 6.31 
Orange  2 litre  2  0.24  <0.5  -5.69 6.44 -5.89 5.97 
  1  0.55 > 0.5  -5.51  5.97  -5.58  5.86 
Lemonade Can   1  0.01  <0.5  -2.39 1.12 -2.42 1.13 
  1  0.90 > 0.5  -13.68  7.02  -13.69  7.06 
Lemonade Standard  1  0.75 > 0.5  -12.56  6.98  -12.64  6.91 
Lemonade 1.5 litre  1  0.84 > 0.5  -7.00  6.10  -7.00  6.12 
Lemonade  2 litre  1  0.03  <0.5  -5.01 7.18 -5.27 7.25 
  1  0.77 > 0.5  -5.63  5.83  -5.66  5.84 
Lemonade Can Multipacks   1  0.35  <0.5  -9.79 6.12 -9.86 6.20 
Mixed Fruit Can   2  0.17  <0.5  -11.51 6.52 -11.64 6.54 
Mixed Fruit Standard  2  0.3  <0.5  -11.29 6.77 -11.36 6.87 
Mixed Fruit  2 litre  1  0.38  <0.5  -5.41 5.93 -5.45 5.97 
*Simulated elasticities after a one per cent decrease in market coverage.   
37Table 8:  Estimated company mark-ups in the last bi-monthly period. 
Companies Market 
Coverage 
Market Share   Price 
 Per Litre 
 
Marginal Cost




Profit in  
£IR(000) 
Coca Cola  0.22 <0.5  0.02  0.98  0.69  0.31  237.87 
  0.80 > 0.5  0.29  0.98  0.82  0.20  2978.45 
C&C  0.24 <0.5  0.01  0.93  0.75  0.23  79.33 
  0.72 > 0.5  0.13  0.99  0.87  0.14  945.15 
All Others  0.12 <0.5  0.02  1.00  0.76  0.27  128.85 
  0.67 > 0.5  0.15  0.85  0.75  0.17  967.43 
Inside Market   62%        
All Others        
Rank 3  0.15 <0.5  0.0042  0.67  0.51  0.28  27.06 
  0.66  >  0.5  0.0552 0.70  0.60  0.20 352.52 
Rank 4   0.15 <0.5  0.0019  1.24  1.02  0.23  15.52 
  0.59  >  0.5  0.0190 0.79  0.69  0.14 118.10 
Rank 5  0.12 <0.5  0.0038  0.97  0.58  0.37  24.48 
  0.57  >  0.5  0.0278 0.36  0.26  0.27 171.49 
Rank 6  0.11 <0.5  0.0059  0.75  0.65  0.18  39.17 
  0.56  >  0.5  0.0237 0.33  0.23  0.30 145.62 
Rank 7  0.29 <0.5  0.0013  1.47  1.37  0.07  8.45 
  0.96  >  0.5  0.0160 1.89  1.78  0.06 106.28 
Rank 8  0.12 <0.5  0.0001  1.18  0.92  0.20  0.93 
  0.66 > 0.5  0.0120  0.94  0.84  0.12  73.41 
Rank 9  0.04 <0.5  0.0007  1.00  0.61  0.45  6.87 
Rank 10  0.19 <0.5  0.0002  1.08  0.99  0.09  1.03 
Rank 11  0.02 <0.5  0.0001  1.42  1.08  0.24  2.59 
Rank 12  0.23 <0.5  0.0001  1.18  1.08  0.08  0.48 
Rank 13  0.04 <0.5  0.0001  1.87  1.21  0.35  2.27 
 
38Table 9:  Estimated regular segment mark-ups in the last bi-monthly period. 
Regular Segments  Market 
Coverage 
Market Share Price Per 
Litre 
MC Per Litre Mark-up  Profit in  
£IR(000) 
Cola Can   0.10 <0.5  0.00081 1.19  1.09  0.09  5.19 
  0.90 > 0.5  0.02237 1.37  1.23  0.10  235.05 
Cola Standard  0.02 <0.5  0.00015 1.33  0.79  0.47  4.70 
  0.74 > 0.5  0.02757 1.18  1.05  0.11  277.65 
Cola  1.5 litre  0.18 <0.5  0.00077 0.60  0.32  0.53  5.93 
  0.84 > 0.5  0.01265 0.72  0.56  0.23  128.87 
Cola  2 litre  0.10 <0.5  0.00017 0.42  0.34  0.19  0.85 
  0.65 > 0.5  0.07912 0.45  0.33  0.27  720.88 
Cola Can Multipacks   0.30 <0.5  0.00373 0.96  0.72  0.28  34.52 
  0.54 > 0.5  0.00971 0.80  0.63  0.21  102.83 
Orange Can   0.19 <0.5  0.00200 1.16  0.92  0.21  14.59 
  0.84 > 0.5  0.00738 1.36  1.21  0.11  64.26 
Orange Standard  0.11 <0.5  0.00081 1.34  1.13  0.17  7.07 
  0.73 > 0.5  0.01522 1.17  1.05  0.11  117.46 
Orange  1.5 litre  0.33 <0.5  0.00202 0.65  0.52  0.20  17.23 
  0.67 > 0.5  0.00905 0.66  0.55  0.16  60.95 
Orange  2 litre  0.13 <0.5  0.00139 0.54  0.36  0.32  15.23 
  0.63 > 0.5  0.04289 0.47  0.36  0.26  301.44 
Orange Can Multipacks   0.42 <0.5  0.00384 1.02  0.87  0.16  34.53 
Lemonade Can   0.04 <0.5  0.00025 0.85  0.45  0.48  3.22 
  0.87 > 0.5  0.00567 1.42  1.24  0.12  62.60 
Lemonade Standard  0.05 <0.5  0.00030 1.52  1.08  0.27  3.34 
  0.76 > 0.5  0.01143 1.10  0.97  0.12  106.00 
Lemonade 1.5 litre  0.05 <0.5  0.00063 0.58  0.48  0.17  4.04 
  0.90 > 0.5  0.01498 0.69  0.53  0.23  152.79 
Lemonade  2 litre  0.04 <0.5  0.00013 0.50  0.33  0.35  1.39 
  0.70 > 0.5  0.06220 0.39  0.27  0.31  558.88 
Lemonade Can Multipacks 0.20 <0.5  0.00111 1.02  0.63  0.37  11.89 
Mixed Fruit Can   0.23 <0.5  0.00105 1.29  1.16  0.11  9.74 
  0.78 > 0.5  0.00849 1.33  1.20  0.10  69.01 
Mixed Fruit Standard  0.16 <0.5  0.00866 1.15  0.85  0.25  63.79 
  0.79 > 0.5  0.04026 1.32  1.20  0.10  288.25 
Mixed Fruit 1.5 litre  0.27 <0.5  0.00749 0.73  0.56  0.31  58.05 
  0.74 > 0.5  0.00244 0.69  0.59  0.14  14.83 
Mixed Fruit  2 litre  0.33 <0.5  0.00259 0.45  0.32  0.28  19.87 
  0.61 > 0.5  0.12114 0.43  0.32  0.27  819.83 
Mixed Fruit Can Multipack 0.04 < 0.5  0.00004 0.72  0.59  0.18  0.32 
 
39Table 10:  Estimated diet segment mark-ups in the last bi-monthly period. 
Diet  Segments  Market 
Coverage 
Market Share Price Per 
Litre 
MC Per Litre Mark-up  Profit in  
£IR(000) 
Cola Can   0.18  <0.5  0.00050  1.06 0.69 0.33 6.40 
  0.76 > 0.5  0.00587  1.34  1.20  0.11  63.30 
Cola Standard  0.38  <0.5  0.00027  1.19 1.07 0.10 2.04 
  0.91 > 0.5  0.00678  1.26  1.08  0.14  73.98 
Cola  1.5 litre  0.02  <0.5  0.00010  0.68 0.32 0.54 0.98 
  0.76 > 0.5  0.00505  0.71  0.54  0.23  51.76 
Cola  2 litre  0.29 <0.5  0.00363  0.47  0.24  0.54  33.15 
  0.74 > 0.5  0.01737  0.51  0.35  0.31  171.10 
Cola Can Multipacks   0.36 <0.5  0.00495  1.02  0.86  0.16  50.56 
Orange Can   0.70  >  0.5  0.00123  1.18 1.06 0.10 9.24 
Orange Standard  0.52  >  0.5  0.00079  1.17 1.05 0.10 6.09 
Orange  1.5 litre  0.35  <0.5  0.00077  0.68 0.56 0.17 5.66 
Orange  2 litre  0.24 <0.5  0.00110  0.56  0.42  0.25  10.31 
  0.55 > 0.5  0.00353  0.53  0.41  0.22  25.43 
Lemonade Can   0.01  <0.5  0.00001  1.40 0.74 0.47 0.47 
  0.90 > 0.5  0.00287  1.37  1.20  0.13  31.64 
Lemonade Standard  0.75 > 0.5  0.00270  1.26  1.08  0.14  29.66 
Lemonade 1.5 litre  0.84 > 0.5  0.00858  0.67  0.51  0.24  86.65 
Lemonade  2 litre  0.03  <0.5  0.00004  0.52 0.33 0.36 0.45 
  0.77 > 0.5  0.02603  0.56  0.40  0.29  260.59 
Lemonade Can Multipacks 0.35  <0.5  0.00043  0.95 0.78 0.17 4.39 
Mixed Fruit Can   0.17  <0.5  0.00014  1.14 1.00 0.12 1.44 
Mixed Fruit Standard  0.3  <0.5  0.00040  1.12 1.01 0.10 2.97 
Mixed Fruit  2 litre  0.38 <0.5  0.00118  0.52  0.36  0.31  11.74 
  0.18  <0.5  0.00050  1.06 0.69 0.33 6.40 
 
40Table 11: Company Level, Own Price and Sum of Cross Price Elasticties (last period). 










Coca Cola  33  0.22 <0.5  -7.39  4.99  -16.98  9.42 
 23  0.80 > 0.5 -9.86  6.44  -10.30  6.43 
C&C 20  0.24 <0.5  -7.64  5.35  -14.22  7.28 
 21  0.72 > 0.5 -10.01  6.54  -8.96  5.86 
All Others  37  0.12 <0.5  -7.00  4.16  -12.05  8.83 
 20  0.67 > 0.5 -8.54  6.23  -16.09  9.23 
All Others            
Rank 3  11  0.15 <0.5  -6.25  4.50  -12.69  9.46 
 9  0.66 > 0.5 -7.21  6.12  -7.33  6.65 
Rank 4   4  0.15 <0.5  -8.47  4.54  -13.13  5.46 
 3  0.59 > 0.5 -8.06  6.21  -3.68  2.97 
Rank 5  3  0.12 <0.5  -3.73  2.64  -8.96  4.64 
 1  0.57 > 0.5 -3.68  5.44  -3.76  5.31 
Rank 6  3  0.11 <0.5  -8.22  4.26  -8.11  9.86 
 1  0.56 > 0.5 -3.36  5.47  -6.53  10.73 
Rank 7  2  0.29 <0.5  -14.50  6.93  -7.47  4.02 
 2  0.96 > 0.5 -18.15  7.10  -9.17  6.02 
Rank 8  3  0.12 <0.5  -8.11  4.63  -7.87  3.50 
 4  0.66 > 0.5 -9.60  6.46  -12.01  7.94 
Rank 9  6  0.04 <0.5  -3.99  2.07  -5.22  2.97 
Rank 10  1  0.19 <0.5  -11.08  6.74  -12.62  5.77 
Rank 11  2  0.02 <0.5  -8.51  3.14  -11.78  2.77 
Rank 12  1  0.23 <0.5  -12.17  6.27  -11.01  6.17 
Rank 13  1  0.04 <0.5  -2.84  1.09  -6.66  2.29 
*Simulated elasticities after a one per cent increase in market coverage in the new market 
Equilibrium. 
41Table 12: Segment Level, Own Price and Sum of Cross Price Elasticties (last period). 










Cola Can   3  0.10 <0.5  -7.96  5.14  -4.14 2.64 
  3  0.90 > 0.5  -13.57  6.88  -18.34 9.19 
Cola Standard  7  0.02 <0.5  -3.21  1.47  -8.55 3.30 
  4  0.74 > 0.5  -11.75  6.80  -8.54 4.89 
Cola  1.5 litre  2  0.18 <0.5  -4.20  3.62  -9.88 7.04 
  1  0.84 > 0.5  -7.38  6.12  -4.24 3.59 
Cola  2 litre  1  0.10 <0.5  -5.22  1.58  -1.19 1.70 
  4  0.65 > 0.5  -4.64  5.59  -3.90 4.87 
Cola Can Multipacks   4  0.30 <0.5  -8.20  5.05  -13.90 7.05 
 1  0.54 > 0.5  -8.05  6.44  -5.33 4.10 
Orange Can   4  0.19 <0.5  -9.50  5.35  -11.23 5.96 
  2  0.84 > 0.5  -13.56  7.03  -18.57 9.57 
Orange Standard  6  0.11 <0.5  -7.22  3.39  -24.37 8.17 
  4  0.73 > 0.5  -11.80  6.81  -8.70 5.06 
Orange  1.5 litre  3  0.33 <0.5  -6.74  6.18  -2.68 2.37 
  2  0.67 > 0.5  -6.83  6.11  -3.00 2.67 
Orange  2 litre  1  0.13 <0.5  -5.21  6.73  -5.10 5.10 
  4  0.63 > 0.5  -4.94  5.66  -4.87 6.00 
Orange  Can Multipacks   3  0.42 <0.5  -10.40  6.66  -13.08 10.21 
Lemonade Can   3  0.04 <0.5  -3.51  2.88  -8.97 6.55 
  1  0.87 > 0.5  -14.09  6.96  -18.90 9.42 
Lemonade Standard  2  0.05 <0.5  -8.02  3.59  -7.32 3.20 
  3  0.76 > 0.5  -11.09  6.73  -7.02 4.25 
Lemonade 1.5 litre  2  0.05 <0.5  -6.26  4.14  -10.66 5.68 
  1  0.90 > 0.5  -7.08  6.13  -3.77 3.29 
Lemonade  2 litre  1  0.04 <0.5  -5.31  6.32  -1.59 1.68 
  3  0.70 > 0.5  -4.02  5.57  -4.66 6.26 
Lemonade Can Multipacks   2  0.20 <0.5  -5.95  3.79  -11.44 9.08 
Mixed Fruit Can   4  0.23 <0.5  -12.73  6.98  -8.24 4.21 
  3  0.78 > 0.5  -13.34  6.96  -15.93 10.49 
Mixed Fruit Standard  10  0.16 <0.5  -7.44  3.73  -7.29 3.91 
  9  0.79 > 0.5  -13.08  6.88  -19.23 12.50 
Mixed Fruit 1.5 litre  6  0.27 <0.5  -6.73  5.68  -8.08 8.03 
  1  0.74 > 0.5  -7.21  6.23  -5.01 4.27 
Mixed Fruit  2 litre  2  0.33 <0.5  -4.80  5.50  -5.23 7.61 
  6  0.61 > 0.5  -4.48  5.63  -5.97 7.66 
Mixed Fruit Can Multipacks   1  0.04 < 0.5  -7.85  3.28  -7.46 2.42 
*Simulated elasticities in the new market Equilibrium.  
42Table 13: Segment Level, Own Price and Sum of Cross Price Elasticties (last period). 










Cola Can   2  0.18  <0.5  -5.70 4.01 -8.30 4.17 
  2  0.76 > 0.5  -13.43  6.95  -15.99  8.21 
Cola Standard  1  0.38 <0.5  -12.15  6.81  -4.63  2.66 
  1  0.91 > 0.5  -12.50  6.86  -12.65  6.92 
Cola  1.5 litre  3  0.02 <0.5  -3.64  1.55  -12.62  3.69 
  1  0.76 > 0.5  -7.30  6.26  -3.80  3.29 
Cola  2 litre  3  0.29  <0.5  -3.95 4.16 -2.10 2.53 
  1  0.74 > 0.5  -5.24  5.78  -5.47  5.83 
Cola Can Multipacks   3  0.36  <0.5  -10.22 6.29 -14.88  12.83 
Orange Can   1  0.70 > 0.5  -12.03  6.78  -8.05  4.75 
Orange Standard  1  0.52 > 0.5  -11.77  7.00  -6.65  3.82 
Orange  1.5 litre  1  0.35  <0.5  -7.02 6.28 -3.55 3.16 
Orange  2 litre  2  0.24  <0.5  -5.69 6.44 -2.26 2.27 
  1  0.55 > 0.5  -5.51  5.97  -6.44  6.73 
Lemonade Can   1  0.01 <0.5  -2.39  1.12  -13.04  5.72 
  1  0.90 > 0.5  -13.68  7.02  -16.25  8.40 
Lemonade Standard  1  0.75 > 0.5  -12.56  6.98  -8.95  4.91 
Lemonade 1.5 litre  1  0.84 > 0.5  -7.00  6.10  -4.23  3.70 
Lemonade  2 litre  1  0.03  <0.5  -5.01 7.18 -1.45 1.99 
  1  0.77 > 0.5  -5.63  5.83  -9.07  9.37 
Lemonade Can Multipacks   1  0.35  <0.5  -9.79 6.12 -4.81 3.02 
Mixed Fruit Can   2  0.17 <0.5  -11.51  6.52  -5.37  3.26 
Mixed Fruit Standard  2  0.3 <0.5  -11.29  6.77  -4.71  2.85 
Mixed Fruit  2 litre  1  0.38  <0.5  -5.41 5.93 -4.17 4.57 
*Simulated elasticities in the new market Equilibrium.    
43Table 14: Welfare Counterfactual:  Company Level in the last bi-monthly period. 




Mark-up Mark-up* Profit  in   
£IR(000) 
Profit in  
£IR(000)*
Consumer
Surplus   
£IR(000) 
Consumer
Surplus   
£IR(000)* 
Coca Cola  0.02  0.04  0.31  0.32  237.9 407.4 213.1 225.7 
  0.29  0.29  0.20  0.20  2978.4 2946.4 1636.1 1661.2 
C&C  0.01  0.02  0.23  0.23  79.3  168.8 125.4 125.4 
  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.15  945.1 990.1 739.7 771.0 
All Others  0.02  0.06  0.27  0.28  128.8 401.1 300.9 344.8 
  0.15  0.15  0.17  0.17  967.4 919.6 909.0 833.7 
Inside Market  62%  70%      5337.1 5833.4 3924.2 3961.8 
All Others            
Rank 3  0.0042  0.00510  0.28  0.28  27.06 31.78 31.34 25.07 
  0.0552  0.04830  0.20  0.20  352.52 303.58 282.09 275.82 
Rank 4   0.0019  0.00830  0.23  0.22  15.52 54.09 37.61 50.15 
  0.0190  0.04260  0.14  0.15  118.10 272.37 275.82 244.48 
Rank 5  0.0038  0.03600  0.37  0.40  24.48  246.13 162.99 206.87 
  0.0278  0.02750  0.27  0.28  171.49 171.00 150.45 156.72 
Rank 6  0.0059  0.00390  0.18  0.16  39.17 25.73 43.88 25.07 
  0.0237  0.01210 0.30  0.30  145.62 71.83 112.84 68.96 
Rank 7  0.0013  0.00200  0.07  0.07  8.45  13.09 12.54 12.54 
  0.0160  0.00600  0.06  0.06 106.28  38.42 31.34 31.34 
Rank 8  0.0001  0.00030  0.20 0.20 0.93 1.94 0.00 0.00 
  0.0120  0.01040  0.12  0.12  73.41 62.38 56.42 56.42 
Rank 9  0.0007  0.00270  0.45  0.45  6.87 17.86 6.27 18.81 
Rank 10  0.0002  0.00070  0.09 0.09 1.03 4.37 6.27 6.27 
Rank 11  0.0001  0.00010  0.24 0.29 2.59 4.42 0.00 0.00 
Rank 12  0.0001  0.00010  0.08 0.08 0.48 0.59 0.00 0.00 
Rank 13  0.0001  0.00000  0.35 0.40 2.27 1.08 0.00 0.00 
 
44 Table 15:  Welfare Counterfactual: Regular Segment in the last bi-monthly period. 




Mark-up  Mark-up* Profit in  
£IR(000)








Cola Can   0.00081 0.0022 0.09  0.11 5.2 16.2 6.3 12.5 
  0.02237 0.0120 0.10  0.10  235.1 117.8  75.2  75.2 
Cola Standard  0.00015 0.0002 0.47  0.48  4.7 4.0 0.0 0.0 
  0.02757 0.0292 0.11  0.11  277.7 272.6 188.1 169.3 
Cola  1.5 litre  0.00077 0.0024 0.53  0.53  5.9  17.8 12.5 12.5 
  0.01265 0.0220 0.23  0.23  128.9 221.2 131.6 125.4 
Cola  2 litre  0.00017 0.0006 0.19  0.21  0.8 4.0 0.0 6.3 
  0.07912 0.0779 0.27  0.28  720.9 675.9 438.8 445.1 
Cola Can Multipacks   0.00373 0.0054 0.28  0.29 34.5 39.8 31.3 25.1 
  0.00971 0.0148 0.21  0.21  102.8 150.9  94.0  81.5 
Orange Can   0.00200 0.0026 0.21  0.22 14.6 19.7 12.5 18.8 
  0.00738 0.0051 0.11  0.11 64.3 46.1 31.3 31.3 
Orange Standard  0.00081 0.0060 0.17  0.17  7.1  41.5 31.3 31.3 
  0.01522 0.0223 0.11  0.11  117.5 174.9 144.2 125.4 
Orange  1.5 litre  0.00202 0.0063 0.20  0.20 17.2 50.6 31.3 31.3 
  0.00905 0.0269 0.16  0.17  60.9  177.9 163.0 156.7 
Orange  2 litre  0.00139 0.0015 0.32  0.33 15.2 14.7  6.3  6.3 
  0.04289 0.0441 0.26  0.26  301.4 319.2 250.7 244.5 
Orange Can Multipacks   0.00384 0.0063 0.16  0.16 34.5 55.1 37.6 37.6 
Lemonade Can   0.00025 0.0011 0.48  0.48  3.2 6.9 6.3 6.3 
  0.00567 0.0042 0.12  0.13 62.6 46.3 25.1 25.1 
Lemonade Standard  0.00030 0.0005 0.27  0.29  3.3 5.9 0.0 0.0 
  0.01143 0.0183 0.12  0.12  106.0 166.8 100.3 106.6 
Lemonade 1.5 litre  0.00063 0.0004 0.17  0.17  4.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 
  0.01498 0.0282 0.23  0.24  152.8 282.0 144.2 156.7 
Lemonade  2 litre  0.00013 0.0004 0.35  0.36  1.4 4.3 0.0 0.0 
  0.06220 0.0515 0.31  0.32  558.9 442.6 250.7 288.4 
Lemonade Can Multipacks   0.00111 0.0020 0.37  0.38 11.9 20.7 12.5 12.5 
Mixed Fruit Can   0.00105 0.0022 0.11  0.11  9.7  19.1 18.8 18.8 
  0.00849 0.0056 0.10  0.10 69.0 46.8 31.3 31.3 
Mixed Fruit Standard  0.00866 0.0436 0.25  0.26  63.8  302.0 206.9 257.0 
  0.04026 0.0424 0.10  0.10  288.2 322.0 231.9 231.9 
Mixed Fruit 1.5 litre  0.00749 0.0086 0.31  0.30 58.0 69.4 50.1 50.1 
  0.00244 0.0035 0.14  0.14 14.8 20.9 18.8 18.8 
Mixed Fruit  2 litre  0.00259 0.0033 0.28  0.29 19.9 29.2 18.8 18.8 
  0.12114 0.0876 0.27  0.27  819.8 591.7 507.8 495.2 
Mixed Fruit Can Multipacks 0.00004 0.0002 0.18  0.19  0.3 2.2 0.0 0.0 
 
45Table 16: Welfare Counterfactual:  Diet Segment in the last bi-monthly period. 




Mark-up  Mark-up* Profit in  
£IR(000)








Cola Can   0.00050 0.0050 0.33  0.34  6.4  51.7  31.3 31.3 
  0.00587 0.0038  0.11 0.11 63.3 38.9 25.1 25.1 
Cola Standard  0.00027 0.0007 0.10  0.10  2.0  5.3  6.3 6.3 
  0.00678 0.0067  0.14 0.14 74.0 71.2 43.9 37.6 
Cola  1.5 litre  0.00010 0.0002 0.54  0.55  1.0  1.4  0.0 0.0 
  0.00505 0.0098  0.23 0.23 51.8 97.3 56.4 56.4 
Cola  2 litre  0.00363 0.0070  0.54 0.54 33.2 59.7 31.3 37.6 
  0.01737 0.0167 0.31  0.31  171.1 158.5  94.0 94.0 
Cola Can Multipacks   0.00495 0.0063  0.16 0.16 50.6 62.7 43.9 37.6 
Orange Can   0.00123 0.0018 0.10  0.11  9.2  14.0  12.5 12.5 
Orange Standard  0.00079 0.0014 0.10  0.11  6.1  11.0  6.3 6.3 
Orange  1.5 litre  0.00077 0.0015 0.17  0.18  5.7  11.4  6.3 6.3 
Orange  2 litre  0.00110 0.0027  0.25 0.26 10.3 24.6 12.5 12.5 
  0.00353 0.0031  0.22 0.23 25.4 22.1 18.8 18.8 
Lemonade Can   0.00001 0.0000 0.47  0.50  0.5  0.1  0.0 0.0 
  0.00287 0.0024  0.13 0.13 31.6 26.1 12.5 12.5 
Lemonade Standard  0.00270 0.0038  0.14 0.14 29.7 40.8 25.1 18.8 
Lemonade 1.5 litre  0.00858 0.0142 0.24  0.24  86.6  141.3  81.5 81.5 
Lemonade  2 litre  0.00004 0.0001 0.36  0.36  0.4  1.6  0.0 0.0 
  0.02603 0.0163 0.29  0.29  260.6 159.3  81.5 94.0 
Lemonade Can Multipacks   0.00043 0.0009 0.17  0.18  4.4  8.8  6.3 6.3 
Mixed Fruit Can   0.00014 0.0003 0.12  0.12  1.4  2.5  0.0 0.0 
Mixed Fruit Standard  0.00040 0.0009 0.10  0.10  3.0  6.6  6.3 6.3 
Mixed Fruit  2 litre  0.00118 0.0015  0.31 0.31 11.7 15.1 12.5 6.3 
 








































































































































































































Figure III: Distance normalization
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